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WHAT HAPPENS WHEN AIR BAGS KILL:
AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY FOR
INJURIES CAUSED BY AIR BAGS
INTRODUCrION
On a Sunday morning in late September, Pamela and David
Gable get into their 1994 Dodge Intrepid to go to church.' The
road is wet from an early morning rain.2 As she attempts to nego-
tiate a turn in the road, Mrs. Gable loses control of the vehicle and
it crashes into the guardrail and stops.3 The vehicle's driver and
passenger-side air bags deploy upon impact at a rate of up to 211
miles per hour,4 and in less than 1/30th of a second both Pamela's
and David's lives are forever changed. Mr. Gable, a thirty-five year
old father of one, suffers a broken neck in the relatively minor
traffic accident, resulting in total paralysis5
Unfortunately, the tragedy of air bag induced injury and death
has become a recurring event. One-year-old Alexandra Greer was
decapitated when the air bag in her mother's car deployed follow-
ing a low speed parking lot accident.6 Frances Ambrose, age 5,
was wearing both her lap and shoulder belts when an air bag killed
See Gable v. Chrysler Corp., No. 322748 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County filed Jan.
13, 1997) (on file with author).
± See id.
3 See id.
' See id.; see also NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., AIR BAG DEPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTIcs 31 (1992) (noting the peak and aver-
age deployment velocities of different types of air bags).
& See Gable, No. 322748.
See Bob Fick, Ghoulish Accident Focuses Attention On Air Bags: Federal Expert
Investigate 1-Year Old's Decapitation, PITT. POsT-GAZETTE, Nov. 28, 1996, at A20 (quot-
ing the police as stating that "the air bag's impact was so strong that the child's head
was forced through the car's passenger-side window, decapitating her and throwing her
head out onto the parking lot'); see also Paul Beebe, Baby Wasn't Strapped In, Agency
Says of Accident: Ada County's Coroner Reached Similar Findings, THE IDAHO STATES-
MEN, May 9, 1997, at IA.
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her following a minor traffic accident in 1996.2 These are but two
examples of the awesome force and deadly power that lie in wait
behind the dashboard in nearly all new vehicles today.
As of October 15, 1997, "air bags have killed at least 85 pas-
sengers and drivers during low-speed crashes in which occupants
would have survived if the air bag had not deployed.... 47 of
those killed were children, and 14 of the adults were women who
were 62 inches tall or shorter."8 These figures do not include peo-
ple like Mr. Gable who have suffered serious injuries, such as
quadriplegia.9 Even more disturbing than the number of injuries
that have already occurred, however, is the likelihood that these
figures will increase dramatically as air bags are installed in more
vehicles. This Note will focus on the potential issues raised by
these cases and will suggest that in certain circumstances it would
be proper to hold the auto industry financially responsible for the
injuries that are caused by these "safety" devices.'"
Part I of this Note will look briefly into the history of the
development of air bags in the United States. It will explain the
initial enactment of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966 ("Safety Act")," and the subsequent history of the
safety standards that have been promulgated under it. In particular,
this Note will develop the convoluted history of Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208 ("FMVSS 208"),2 and discuss
its role in the current air bag controversy.
Part II will discuss federal preemption, which is of major
importance to any products liability lawsuit involving air bags. It
will analyze the line of decisions in the "no air bag" or "failure to
install" cases, to see what impact they might have on the types of
cases envisioned in this paper. This Note will then assess the cur-
rent status of federal preemption following the United States Su-
. See Girl Killed By Air Bag Was Properly Belted: Finding Is A First For U.S.
Agency, Which Is Proposing New Warning Labels For Vehicles, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1996, at D2.
8 Air Bags: Parents' Group Opposes Amendment to End Required Protection of
Unbelted Occupants, 25 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 1008 (Oct. 24, 1997).
. See Gable, No. 322748.
10. As will be discussed later, this Note does not suggest that the automotive industry
ought to be the insurer of its products, or that it has a duty to produce a vehicle that
will be safe in every collision.
" 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
2- 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1996).
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preme Court decisions in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,3 and
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,4 and explain why defective air bag
claims should not be preempted.
In Part III the doctrine of "crashworthiness,"' 5 which is in-
volved in automobile defect litigation, will be addressed. After
discussing the origins of the doctrine in the seminal case Larsen v.
General Motors Corp., its importance in defective air bag litiga-
tion will be analyzed. Several potential products liability causes of
action against the auto manufacturers will be evaluated. In particu-
lar, the different theories of strict liability, negligence, and failure
to warn (at least not adequately) will be discussed. Perhaps most
importantly, this Note will evaluate the two opposing tests involved
in products liability design defects cases: "the consumer expectation
test"'7 and "the risk/benefit test."'8
In conclusion, this Note focuses on the potential liability of
auto manufacturers for injuries caused by the explosive force at
which the current generation of air bags deploy. It hopes to explain
why, in certain circumstances, it is wholly appropriate for the
automotive industry to be liable for injuries that they knew were
going to occur. This principle in American jurisprudence traces
back to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 9 in which Judge
Cardozo said that the "presence of a known danger, attendant upon
a known use, makes vigilance a duty."2 While Cardozo was
speaking of manufacturing defects at the time, there is no reason to
distinguish between manufacturing and design defects in this situa-
tion.
13. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
, 514 U.S. 280 (1995). Freightliner is of particular importance because in addition to
being the most recent Supreme Court decision on this issue, it deals with preemption of a
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS 121, concerning anti-lock brakes). See id.
S. See R. Ben Hogan III, The Crashworthiness Doctrine, 18 AM. J. TRIAL 'ADVOC. 37
(1994).
' 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
'7 See REsTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (formulating the consumer
expectation test).
"L See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
U. 825, 837-38 (1973) (discussing the factors to be considered in applying such a stan-
dard).
* III N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
Id. at 1053.
19981
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I. BACKGROUND
In 1966, Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act,' which grants the Secretary of Transportation
the authority to establish appropriate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards.22 The Act defines a safety standard as "a minimum
standard for motor vehicle, or motor vehicle equipment perfor-
mance." The Secretary of Transportation has delegated its au-
thority to the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration ("NHTSA"). 4 Pursuant to this authority, NHTSA
has been issuing safety standards pertinent to this Note's analysis
since 1967.'
FMVSS 208, one of the original safety standards issued by
NHTSA, initially required manual lap belts in all vehicles.26 On
November 3, 1970, NHTSA published a final rule requiring the use
of passive restraints, such as air bags.2 Due to considerable resis-
tance from members of the automotive community, including the
carmakers, NHTSA postponed the effective date of the rule.'
Continued resistance led to a number of delays and postponements
until Secretary of Transportation William Coleman decided to sus-
pend the passive restraint requirement indefinitely in December
1976.9 This suspension proved to be short-lived. In January 1977,
Joan Claybrook, the new administrator of NHTSA under President
Carter, promptly issued a new mandatory passive restraint standard
21. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
' See id. § 30101.
2 Id. § 30102(a)(9).
2. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.50(a) (1997); see also Frieghtliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S.
280, 284 (1995) (noting the delegation of authority).
NHTSA's Initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards were issued in 1967. See
Initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 32 Fed. Reg. 2408 (1967). For a thorough
analysis of the history of FMVSS 208 see Kurt B. Chadwell, Comment, Automobile Pas-
sive 'Restraint Claims Post Cippolone: An End to the Federal Preemption Defense, 46
BAYLOR L. REv. 141, 143-51 (1994).
' See Initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 32 Fed. Reg. at 2415, cited in
Chadwell, supra note 25, at 144.
" See Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection in Passenger Cars,
Multipurpose Passenger Vehicles, Trucks, and Buses, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,927, 16,929 (1970).
'- See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 36 Fed.
Reg. 4600 (1970), cited in Chadwell, supra note 25, at 145-46; see also Chrysler Corp.
v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972) (discussing the delay of the
rule's effectiveness).
'9 See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 42 Fed.
Reg. 5071, 5071 (1977) (incorporating the Secretary's decision into the Federal Register
by reference), cited in Chadwell, supra note 25, at 146-47.
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called Modified Standard 208.0
FMVSS 208 was again thrown into turmoil in 1981 when
President Reagan's Secretary of Transportation, Drew Lewis, de-
layed3' and then rescinded the passive restraint standard.32 This
rescission was promptly held to be "arbitrary and capricious" by
the Supreme Court because it failed to consider alternatives to
rescission, such as compliance by means of air bags or nondetach-
able automatic seat belts.33 It also failed to explain why those al-
ternatives were not adopted.34 On July 17, 1984, Claybrook's rule,
which called for a phase-in of automatic protection beginning in
the 1987 model year, was reinstated.3'
This did not end the battle completely, however, as the com-
pliance date was repeatedly delayed by the automotive industry.
NHTSA attempted to end the controversy in 1993, when they once
again amended FMVSS 208.36 The amended standard repealed the
phase-in period and set a mandatory compliance date of September
1, 1997 for all passenger cars. 7
Before this date, the standard allowed the automakers to com-
ply by installing one of two passive restraint features: an air bag,
or an automatic seat belt system with a warning light that signaled
when the belt was disengaged.3 While the standard does make
' See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 42 Fed.
Reg. 34,299, 34,304 (1977). The new rule phased in passive restraints gradually until all
cars were covered by model year 1984. See id. It also gave manufacturers the option to
choose between air bags and automatic belts. See id.
' See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 46 Fed.
Reg. 21,172, 21,177 (1981), cited in Chadwell, supra note 25, at 147-48.
. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 46 Fed.
Reg. 53,419, 53,427 (1981), cited in Chadwell, supra note 25, at 148.
' See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
46 (1983) ("[W]e hold that the agency failed to present an adequate basis and explanation
for rescinding the passive restraint requirement and that the agency must either consider
the matter further or adhere to or amend Standard 208 along lines which its analysis sup-
ports.").
See id. at 57.
3' See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Occupant Crash Protection, 49 Fed.
Reg. 28,962, 29,009-10 (1984).
' See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 58 Fed.
Reg. 46,551, 46,563 (1993).
3' See UL; see also Cynthia M. Certo, Comment, 1993 Changes to Safety Standard
208: Deploying an (Air) Bag Full of Product Liability Claims?, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 673,
680 (1994) (discussing the repeal of the phase-in period). All passenger cars produced
after September 1, 1997 are required to have both driver and passenger-side air bags. See
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 58 Fed. Reg. at
46,553.
- See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 58 Fed.
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passive restraint systems (air bags) mandatory as of the 1998 mod-
el year, it does not specify how the air bag should operate, the
speed at which it should deploy, or the design, placement, or engi-
neering involved in the air bag itself.3 9 The standard is a mini-
mum federal performance standard, which merely ensures that each
air bag system meets "specified injury criteria, as measured on a
test dummy, when tested in a 30 miles per hour barrier crash
test."'  This will be extremely important to understand when as-
sessing individual claims against the auto manufacturers. Mere
compliance with a federal minimum standard is not an automatic
bar to recovery, and can often be a poor defense." In spite of
this, the standard's mere existence will almost certainly lead the
automotive industry to claim that all air bag claims are preempted.
II. THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION QUESTION
One of the most controversial and passionate battlegrounds in
the field of automobile products liability over the past twenty years
has concerned the issue of federal preemption.42 For organizational
Reg. at 46,553, cited in Chadwell, supra note 25, at 149-50.
" In response to comments by General Motors Corp., NHTSA gave the automobile
industry flexibility; NHTSA completely removed air bag specifications from its definition
of an "inflatable passive restraint system." See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards,
Occupant Crash Protection, 58 Fed. Reg. at 46,562.
4*. Id. at 46,553.
41. For cases that have found that compliance with a federal minimum safety standard
does not exempt a manufacturer from common law strict liability, see Shipp v. General
Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that while General Motors' compli-
ance with a federal safety standard regarding roof strength was "persuasive and contradic-
tory to plaintiff's proof," it "[o]f course ... does not exempt or immunize a manufactur-
er from common law strict liability"); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511,
1516-17 (6th Cir. 1983) ("GM also challenges the jury verdict with what strikes us as a
notably ill-conceived argument that the F-37 roof complied with certain federal safety
standards and thus as a matter of law could not have been defective or negligently de-
signed. We disagree."); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 472 F.2d 659,
670 n.13 (6th Cir. 1972) ("[Clompliance with Federal Standards is not a defense to a
products liability action. .. .').
4 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995), Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), and Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.
1989) are particularly instructive on the issue of federal preemption and are discussed
further in this section. Elaboration on this point is found in Wood v. General Motors
Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (Ist Cir. 1988) (holding that while plaintiff's claim that her Chevro-
let Blazer was defective because it lacked air bags was not expressly preempted, it was
impliedly preempted). See also Gregory L. Taddonio, Revisiting Myrick v. Freightliner.
Applying the Brakes on Restrictive Preemption Analysis, 14 J.L. & CoM. 257 (1995)
(discussing preemption); Chadwell, supra note 25; Keith C. Miller, Comment, Deflating
the Airbag Pre-emption Controversy, 37 EMORY LJ. 897 (1988) (examining the passive
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reasons, this Note will begin by giving a general overview of the
doctrine of federal preemption. It will then discuss the case law
concerning the preemption of "failure to install" air bag cases, and
the potential effect of United States Supreme Court decisions in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc..' and Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick." Finally, it will explain why air bag claims based on de-
fective design cannot and should not be preempted.
A. The Concept of Federal Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution de-
clares that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law
of the Land."'4 It is fairly well established that the federal law
may preempt a state law in three ways.
First, Congress may include express preemption language
in the statute itself. Second, if express preemption is
absent, Congress may nonetheless imply preemption by
evidencing an intent to 'occupy a given field' thereby
precluding any state law within that field .... Third,
where Congress has not entirely superseded the state
regulation in a specific area, state law is still preempted
to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law.6
Put simply, the three types of preemption are: (1) express, (2)
occupation of the field, and (3) conflict. Both the second and third
types of preemption are "implied."'
B. Federal Preemption and "Failure to Install"
Cases
As previously discussed, FMVSS 208 was promulgated under
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.0 The
Safety Act has two statutory provisions of particular importance to
restraint preemption controversy); Beverly L. Jacklin, Annotation, Federal Preemption of
State Common-Law Product Liability Claims Pertaining to Motor Vehicles, 97 A.L.R. FED.
853 (1990) (collecting federal and state cases that discuss preemption of state common
law products liability claims).
' 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
" 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
' U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Jacklin, supra note 42, § 2(a).
4' See Chadwell, supra note 25, at 151.
- 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
1998]
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this discussion. The "preemption clause" provides, in pertinent part:
When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under
this chapter, a State... may prescribe or continue in
effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of perfor-
mance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only
if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under
this chapter. However . . . a State, or a political subdivi-
sion of a State may prescribe a standard for a motor vehi-
cle or motor vehicle equipment obtained for its own use
that imposes a higher performance requirement than that
required by the otherwise applicable standard under this
chapter.49
The Act also contains a "savings clause" which reads, in pertinent
part, "compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed
under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at com-
mon law."5
The effect of these two clauses on "failure to install" air bag
claims has been the topic of heated debate between injured plain-
tiffs, consumer advocates, and the automotive industry. " Examin-
ing this debate is useful in determining what principles are guiding
the courts in their decision-making process. These cases have been
included in this discussion because they illustrate precisely why a
claim based on the defective design of an air bag system should
not and will not be preempted.
In a typical "failure to install" air bag case, the plaintiff asserts
that the vehicle is defectively designed because it does not have an
air bag system in the car.52 The auto manufacturer immediately
49. Id. § 30103(b) (1994).
-- Id. § 30103(e) (1994).
" See Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (addressing the
preemption of a state common law products liability claim); Gills v. Ford Motor Co., 829
F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (finding that a products liability claim was impliedly pre-
empted); Kelly v. General Motors Corp., 705 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. La. 1988) (finding im-
plied preemption); Schick v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D.S.D. 1987) (holding
claim preempted); Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761 (D.C. Md. 1986) (finding
that a common law claim based on failure to install an air bag in a vehicle was express-
ly preempted); Christine M. Condon, Annotation, Products Liability: Defective Motor Vehi-
cle Air Bags Systems, 39 A.L.R. 5TH 267 (1996) (collecting cases that consider whether
and to what extent liability may be imposed based on air bag system defectiveness).
' See Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 396 (Ist Cir. 1988) (alleging
defective design on the basis of no air bags).
[Vol 48:659
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asserts that the claim is expressly preempted by federal law 3 be-
cause FMVSS 208 clearly permits cars that are made before Sep-
tember 1, 1997 to be sold without air bags 4 Any claim based on
the theory that the vehicle was defective for lack of an air bag is
in conflict with the standard and is preempted."
While this approach has not been entirely unsuccessful, the
automakers have had a greater level of success on their claim of
implied preemption 6 Some courts have held that failure to install
claims are impliedly preempted because to hold otherwise would
frustrate the purpose of the Safety Act by, in effect, allowing the
court to impose a higher safety standard than the federal law. 7
Other courts have found these claims to have been impliedly pre-
empted for somewhat different reasons5 The Eleventh Circuit
held that the plaintiff's common law claims were preempted be-
cause they would have the effect of negating the three options
given to automakers under FMVSS 208."9 Similarly, the Third
Circuit held these claims to be preempted because imposing liabili-
ty for not installing an air bag would create an "actual, clear con-
flict" with the choices provided for in FMVSS 208.'
C. The Cipollone Decision
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the
preemption issue with respect to air bags, it has, on two recent
occasions, attempted to clarify the factors that courts should con-
sider when deciding whether or not a specific claim has been pre-
" See id.
See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 58 Fed.
Reg. 46,551, 46,563 (1993); supra note 37 and accompanying text.
' See Wood, 865 F.2d at 401 ("[A]lleging that the absence of an air bag rendered
the vehicle's design faulty, would, if upheld, clearly 'stand as an obstacle' to the regulato-
ry scheme of the Safety Act."); see also Certo, supra note 37, at 687 (discussing the
Wood opinion).
' See Certo, supra note 37, at 687-88 (discussing the leading air bag preemption
cases, particularly the decisions focusing on implied preemption).
" See Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding the
plaintiff's claim impliedly preempted); Wood, 865 F.2d at 402 ("We are convinced that
Congress's purposes, as revealed in the Safety Act and in the legislative history, plainly
imply a preemptive intent.").
. See Pokomy v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that fail-
ure to install claims are impliedly preempted); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d
816 (lth Cir. 1989) (holding impliedly preempted a defective design claim based on the
absence of air bags).
" See Taylor, 875 F.2d at 827.
6" See Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1123.
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empted. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,6t the Court stated:
"When Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has
included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing
that issue, and when that provision provides a 'reliable indicium of
congressional intent with respect to state authority,' 'there is no
need to infer congressional intent to preempt state laws."' 62 Justice
Stevens, speaking for the majority, went on to say that "Congress'
enactment of a provision defining the preemptive reach of a statute
implies that matters beyond that reach are preempted." 3 When
looking at the provisions of the statute, the Court must construe
them "in light of the presumption against the preemption of state
police power regulations."
This decision, coupled with the explicit "savings clause" provi-
sion in the Safety Act,' seemed to indicate that preemption would
no longer serve as a monumental barrier to recovery in air bag
cases. Some commentators, most notably consumer advocate Ralph
Nader, expressed the opinion, or at least the hope, that this deci-
sion would end the federal preemption defense in air bag cases.'
This was not the case, however, as the decisions that followed
produced inconsistent outcomes. 67
D. The Freightliner Decision
In Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,s the Supreme Court revisited
the federal preemption doctrine. Freightliner involved state com-
61. 505 U.S. 504 (1994).
62 Id. at 517 (citation omitted) (quoting, in order, Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435
U.S. 497, 505 (1978); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282
(1987) (Marshall, J.)).
63, Id.
Id. at 518 (emphasis added). The Court thus generally favors narrow construction
of preemption provisions when Congress has not seen fit to expressly state the scope of
preemption.
6 See 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (1994); supra note 50 and accompanying text.
" See Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance
with Federal Standards, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 415, 449 (1996) (discussing the ratio-
nale for ending the preemption defense); see also Chadwell, supra note 25, at 142
("Cipollone appears to have sounded a death knell for the implied preemption defense in
no-airbag cases.").
67. Compare Marrs v. Ford Motor Co., 852 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App. 1993) (finding
that the Safety Act did not expressly preempt plaintiff's cause of action), with Boyle v.
Chrysler Corp., 501 N.W.2d 865 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that plaintiff's claim was
expressly preempted). See Nader & Page, supra note 66, at 449-50 for discussion of these
cases and others that have been decided post-Cipollone.
'5 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
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mon law design defect claims against truck and trailer manufactur-
ers who did not equip their vehicles with anti-lock brakes
("ABS").' The Court directly addressed the contention that im-
plied preemption cannot exist when Congress has included an ex-
press preemption clause, finding it to be "without merit."70 Justice
Thomas, speaking for the Court, said that the "fact that an express
definition of the preemptive reach of a statute 'implies'-i.e. sup-
ports a reasonable inference-that Congress did not intend to pre-
empt other matters does not mean that the express clause entirely
forecloses any possibility of implied preemption."' Justice
Thomas went on to say that "Cipollone supports an inference that
an express preemption clause forecloses implied preemption; it does
not establish a rule."
E. Defective Design Litigation
While Freightliner appears to have dashed the hopes of those
who would like to pursue the failure to install claims, it is clearly
not determinative of the future of defective manufacture or defec-
tive design claims involving air bags. The fact that air bags will
soon be mandatory in all new vehicles,73 coupled with the fact
that they can cause serious injuries, particularly to the young, old,
and small of stature,74 makes it likely that defective manufacture
and design litigation will be the next, and potentially much more
important battle in the field of automobile products liability.
One case of note on the defective design issue is Perry v.
Mercedes Benz of North America Inc.,5 in which the Fifth Circuit
held that the federal law did not preempt a claim based on an
alleged design defect which caused an air bag to not inflate upon
" See id. at 280.
See id at 287.
71 Id. at 288.
72- Id. at 289. The Court held that in this case the common law tort claims were not
preempted. See id. The majority reasoned that there could not be any conflict in this
situation because the pertinent safety standard had been suspended and, as such, did not
regulate the use of ABS devices at all. See id.
" See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 58 Fed.
Reg. 46,551, 46,563 (1993); supra note 37 and accompanying text.
74 See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., EFFECTIVENESS OF OCCUPANT
PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND THEIR USE 2-3 (1996) [hereinafter NHTSA, EFFECTIVENESS]
(providing statistics for various "occupant protection systems" for the years 1987-1995,
and noting that the probability of injury for these classes of people is increased if such
systems are not installed).
7S. 957 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1992).
669
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impact.76 After initially determining that Perry's defective design
claim was not expressly preempted,77 the court went on to decide
the issue of implied preemption.8
The court indicated there were two primary questions it would
need to answer to resolve the issue.79 The first question concerned
whether the "imposition of state-law tort liability for the defective
design of an air bag system [would] conflict with the federal
law."8 The court felt that it was obvious that there would be no
conflict because the standard only required compliance with mini-
mum performance standards, and "the manufacturer c[ould] still
comply with both the federal standard and the state tort stan-
dard."81 The second question concerned whether state tort liability
would conflict with the federal law by standing "'as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress."'82 The court concluded that there most certain-
ly would not be a conflict.83 The court arrived at this conclusion
by reading the savings clause of the Safety Act. 4 While this deci-
sion is not the last word on the issue, some commentators have
read it as a signal that states may impose higher standards for
safety than those presently required by the federal government.85
7 See id. at 1259.
7' See id. at 1264.
7" See id.
7" See id.
so- Id.
" Id.
Id. (quoting California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281
(1987)). Some courts, using this form of analysis, found the failure to install claims to be
preempted; they felt that imposing state tort liability would frustrate and interfere with
"'Congress's chosen method as well as ... the ultimate goal of the statute."' Id. (alter-
ation in original) (emphasis removed from original) (quoting Wood v. General Motors
Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 408 (1990)).
'" See id.
See id. The court reviewed the legislative history of the statute and found it was
helpful and supportive of their finding on this issue, although not entirely necessary in
their decision. See id. The history of the statute is not cited by the court because "the
Savings Clause itself unambiguously reveals Congress' intent to preserve common law
liability." Id. Recall that the savings clause states that "compliance with a motor vehicle
safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at
common law." 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (1994).
'" See J.B. Block, Perry v. Mercedes Benz of North America Inc.: The National Traf-
fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act Meets the Unreasonably Dangerous Standard, 67 TUL
L. REV. 850, 858-59 (1993) (discussing the effect of the decision on the states); Certo,
supra note 37, at 691 ("The Perry case has been interpreted as a 'thumbs-up' for states
that wish to impose higher standards of safety than those presently required by the federal
government.").
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Further, several other courts, using similar analyses, have
reached the same conclusion that state common law claims based
on design defects in air bags are not preempted by the Safety
Act.8 6 The courts reason that: (1) state tort claims have not been
expressly preempted by the clear language of the statute; (2) state
tort claims have not been impliedly preempted in that the statute
takes up the entire field; and (3) because a finding of liability
under state tort law would not necessarily conflict with the federal
law, state tort claims have not been impliedly preempted.8 7 The
following passage states the rationale behind this theory quite suc-
cinctly:
It is apparent that the National Traffic Safety Act is intend-
ed to be supplementary of and in addition to the common
law of negligence and product liability. The common law is
not sterile or rigid and serves the best interests of society
by adapting standards of conduct and responsibility that
fairly meet the emerging and developing needs of our
time.... The Act is ... not an exemption from common
law liability.88
' See Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 957 F. Supp. 349 (D.P.R. 1997), and
Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 481 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. 1997), for examples of
cases in which state claims were held not to be preempted.
37 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. For example, assume that an air
bag system that complied with the federal standards caused a serious injury or death
following a low speed collision. Assume further that this particular air bag deployed at a
rate of 200 MPH. If it could be determined that the air bag could have met the injury
requirements and thus complied with the standard by deploying at a slower and safer rate,
one that would not have caused the injury or death, a finding of liability would not be
inconsistent with the standard. Both could be met.
Another example may illustrate this principle more clearly. Assume that the safety
standard does not establish a minimum collision speed at which the air bag must deploy.
Assume also that the air bag system in the vehicle complies with the safety standard, but
is designed so that it will deploy in collisions of five miles per hour and above. If seri-
ous injury or death was caused by the air bag being deployed during such a low speed
crash, a finding of liability would not be inconsistent with the standard, because the air
bag did not have to deploy at all in this situation.
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968). Some might
question the use of this passage because the case was decided soon after the statute's
enactment, and did not seriously address the issue of preemption. However, the case is
not being cited for its precedential value; it is being cited for the correctuess of its think-
ing.
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III. CRASHWORTHINESS, DESIGN DEFECTS, AND SECTION 402A
Establishing that a claim is not preempted is not the end of the
battle, it merely allows the fight to begin. Before entering this
battle, however, the skillful practitioner must determine the correct
theoretical and legal foundations upon which a claim can be
made. 9 As previously stated, the origins of modem products lia-
bility and crashworthiness can be found in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co." In a case involving an allegedly defective wheel on
an automobile, Cardozo stated the new rule of manufacturer liabili-
ty in negligence:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain
to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is
then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the
consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger
there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by
persons ... without new tests, then, irrespective of con-
tract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a
duty to make it carefully.9
When the "crashworthiness" or "second collision" doctrine was
introduced in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,'e this duty was
greatly expanded. In Larsen, the plaintiff did not allege that a
defect in the vehicle caused the accident.93 Rather, he asserted that
his injuries were made worse because of an allegedly defective
89. Many states have enacted products liability statutes which may dictate how, or if, a
claim may be made. In Ohio, for example, Ohio Revised Code sections 2307.71 through
2307.801 comprise the substantive law governing the area of products liability. See OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.71-2307.801 (Anderson 1997). There has also been a tremen-
dous movement recently to enact so-called "tort reform" statutes in many states, which
may have a significant impact on these types of cases. In Ohio, for example, the "con-
sumer expectation" test has been legislatively repealed in design defect cases. See id. §
2307.75. The defective air bag cases illustrate some of the reasons why this rigid, ill-
conceived rule is a travesty. It is an unfortunate fact that ordinary citizens, who are all
potential future plaintiffs, do not have the lobbying force of groups such as the insurance
industry. However, the wisdom and prudence of the "tort reform" statutes in Ohio or
elsewhere are not the subject of this Note. The statutes have been mentioned because they
have been enacted and must be taken into consideration at every stage of preparation
when evaluating and litigating a defective air bag case.
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
91. Id. at 1053.
- 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
" See id. at 497-98. It was not disputed that the defect did not cause the accident to
occur. See id.
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design. 4 General Motors responded that they had "no duty what-
soever to design and manufacture a vehicle .. which is otherwise
'safe' or 'safer' to occupy during collision impacts." 5 The district
court accepted this reasoning and granted General Motors' motion
for summary judgment.'
The appellate court found that this exceedingly narrow analysis
missed the point entirely. The court stated the general rule had
been that the "manufacturer's duty of design and construction ex-
tends to producing a product that is reasonably fit for its intended
use and free of hidden defects that could render it unsafe for such
use." For the court of appeals, the decision turned on the inter-
pretation of intended use." The court's interpretation concluded
with the fact that:
While automobiles are not made for the purpose of collid-
ing with each other, a frequent and inevitable contingency
of normal automobile use will result in collisions and inju-
ry producing impacts. No rational basis exists for limiting
recovery to situations where the defect in design or manu-
facture was the causative factor of the accident, as the
accident and the resulting injury, usually caused by the so-
called 'second collision' of the passenger with the interior
part of the automobile, are all foreseeable.9
This holding marked the advent of the doctrine of
crashworthiness, which is now widely accepted in nearly every
state, although it varies in form from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion." Simply stated, crashworthiness refers to the manufacturer's
duty to eliminate known hazards, risks, and dangers that occur
' See id. at 497. The plaintiff's claim was essentially that upon impact, as a result
of a defective design, the steering mechanism of the car was propelled into his head,
causing serious injuries. See id.
95 Id.
96. See id. The district court stated that General Motors had a duty "to design an
automobile which is reasonably safe when driven and which contains no latent or hidden
defects which could cause an accident and subsequent injury." IL at 464 (emphasis add-
ed).
97. Id. at 501.
'" See id,
I" d. at 502 (emphasis added). This focus on the second impact is critical in air bag
cases, particularly where the injury occurred in a low speed impact. This Note does not
suggest that the auto manufacturers should be liable for injuries sustained in high speed
crashes, where the collision is such that the air bag cannot be said to be the cause of the
injury.
" See Hogan, supra note 15.
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during foreseeable uses of its products.'
In cases where impact with an air bag was the cause of the
injury, there are several theories under which to proceed. The most
notable are negligence, failure to warn, breach of warranty (express
or implied), and strict liability in tort.'02 In practice, pleading
some or all of these alternate theories can be a very effective strat-
egy, and the successful practitioner will be aware of the advantages
and disadvantages that accompany each. 3 In the interest of sim-
plicity, this Note will focus primarily on strict liability in tort and
failure to warn as the essential theories of recovery." These the-
ories will be discussed separately although there is a considerable
amount of overlap between them. Note that although they will not
be explicitly discussed, negligence principles will never be far
beneath the surface.
A. Strict Liability in Tort
The basis for strict liability in tort can be found in section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,t 5 which states that
"01. See id. at 41. In the context of air bag cases, the foreseeable uses obviously in-
clude their deployment during crashes. Other foreseeable circumstances include the fact
that children and small adults may sit in the front passenger seat. It is also foreseeable
that many individuals may not be properly restrained or may be out of position upon
impact. Therefore, manufacturers have a duty to eliminate, or limit as much as practicable,
the dangers involved in these situations.
" See id.; see also David W. Leebron, An Introduction To Products Liability: Ori-
gins, Issues and Trends, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 395, 400 (discussing the different
possible causes of action).
103. See Leebron, supra note 102, at 400. For example, a negligence theory may be
pursued on the basis of a belief that a jury finding of the defendant's "fault" will in-
crease the awarded damages. See id.
,' Strict liability would seem to be the most favorable theory upon which to base a
claim. In application, however, it is often no different from negligence. "While the negli-
gence and strict liability theories may use different catch phrases, and look at the problem
from a different angle (negligence focuses on the manufacturer's actions, while strict lia-
bility focuses on the product itself), in the end the standards for liability are really the
same." Timothy Wilton & Richard P. Campbell, Effect of Federal Safety Regulations on
Crashworthiness Litigation, 22 TORT & INS. LJ. 554, 555 (1987).
,01 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The American Law Insti-
tute ("ALl") is currently in the process of drafting the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod-
ucts Liability. The central focus of this effort is to alter section 402A. See RESTATEMENT
(TMRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABIUTY Foreword (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994). One of
the major issues involved in this debate concerns the proper application of the "consumer
expectation" and "risk-benefit" tests, which will be discussed later in this Note. See infra
Part III C. Many of the positions in this Note differ strongly from the announced posi-
tions of the Restatement (Third). These differences, and the reasons for them, will be
discussed more fully later in the text For a more extensive commentary on the Restate-
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"[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused."'"8 Liability is not ac-
tually strict, however, because it is not to be imposed for every
injury but only for an injury that is the result of a "defective con-
dition unreasonably dangerous.""
Although courts and commentators have struggled to accurately
define these terms, it is helpful to initially look to the Official
Comments for guidance. Two of these comments in particular seem
to have special relevance in determining what is meant by "defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous." Comment g explains that a
product is in a defective condition when it is in a condition "not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him.""0 8 Comment i states that in order for a prod-
uct to be unreasonably dangerous, it must be "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics."'"8 In tandem, these
two comments form the basis of what is called the "consumer
expectation test." Under this test, a product is said to be defective
if it fails to perform in a manner that is consistent with the reason-
able expectations of the ordinary consumer.
Over the years, courts have separated claims involving defec-
tive products into three distinct categories of defectiveness: manu-
facturing defects, design defects, and defectiveness because of a
failure to warn. ° As a practical matter, manufacturing defects
have posed relatively few problems to courts and are of little con-
sequence to cases of the sort contemplated in this Note.'
ment (Third), see generally A Symposium on the ALI's Proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1043 (1994), Symposium, The Revision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Occasion for Reform of Products
Liability Law?, 10 TOuRO L. REv. 1 (1993).
R' ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965).
Id.; see Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design
Defect Litigation, 48 VAND. L. REv. 609, 611 (1995) ("Of course, 'strict liability' was
something of a misnomer. Liability was not to be imposed for all harm caused by a
product--only for harm that was the result of a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous.").
IO RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965).
". Id. § 402A cmt. i. One of the primary purposes of this comment was to avoid the
application of section 402A to such products as whiskey, tobacco, and other food or drug
products that obviously involve certain risks. See id.
" See Leebron, supra note 102, at 401.
For example, an air bag deployed for some unknown reason during the normal
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Design defects, on the other hand, have been far more contro-
versial and complex."' In the area of design defects, many courts
and commentators have found it difficult to distinguish strict liabili-
ty from negligence."' The proper test to apply in design defect
cases has become one of the most controversial issues in products
liability. On one side of the battle is the "consumer expectations"
test with its foundations in section 402A. On the other is what is
often called the "risk-benefit" test, which has its origins in a law
review article by Dean John Wade."4
B. The Risk-Benefit Test
Dean Wade argues that the consumer expectation test is inap-
propriate for determining design defect cases because consumers in
many design situations lack any real or informed expectation."'
The preferable test, he argues, is the risk-benefit test."6 The risk-
benefit test, as it has been applied in many design defect cases,
practically eliminates strict liability and replaces it with a negli-
gence standard. Simply put, the test asks "whether the magnitude
of the risk created by the dangerous condition of the product [is]
outweighed by the social utility attained by putting it out in this
fashion.""' 7 Application requires a balancing of the risks against
the benefits; when the risks of a given design outweigh its bene-
fits, the design is unreasonable and liability should be imposed."'
Wade suggested seven factors to consider when balancing the risks
and benefits:" 9
course of driving and injuries resulted, there would be little trouble establishing liability.
In this situation, the air bag would have failed to meet the manufacturer's own standard
and would therefore be clearly defective. However, if there were a number of component
part manufacturers, the plaintiff may still have to establish which part was defective.
" - See Leebron, supra note 102, at 403; see also David G. Owen, Defectiveness Re-
stated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 743 (dis-
cussing the Third Restatement's complicated definitions of design defectiveness and pro-
posing straightforward liability tests for resolving these disputes).
113. See Leebron, supra note 102, at 403; see also Sheila L. Bimbaum, Unmasking the
Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence,
33 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980) (discussing the different standards of liability which have
been imposed in design defect cases).
"1 See Wade, supra note 18.
See id. at 829.
"' See id.
I. d. at 835.
"' See id.
219. See id. at 837-38.
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(1) The. usefulness and desirability of the product-its
utility to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it
will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the inju-
ry.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe char-
acter of the product without impairing its usefulness or
making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of
care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent
in the product and their avoidability, because of general
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product,
or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of
spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or
carrying liability insurance. 2 '
Over the past twenty years, this test has been used as a shield
to ward off injured plaintiffs, as its proponents attempt to move the
standard for liability closer to negligence.' Upon closer inspec-
tion, however, it seems the test was originally intended to be a
sword which would enable some plaintiffs to recover. If a product
contains an open and obvious danger, a plaintiff most likely would
be unable to recover using the consumer expectation test because
he could not have any legitimate expectation of safety. Using the
risk-benefit test, however, he might have an opportunity to recover
if it were determined that the benefits of the chosen design were
outweighed by the risks involved. For example, if a punch press
machine were designed without a safety guard, it could still be
defective, in spite of the fact that it is obviously dangerous. The
benefits of designing the machine without a safety guard would
likely be outweighed by the risk of serious injury that would be
inherent in such a design.
This "softer" interpretation of the risk-benefit test appears to be
'1 id.
. See Owen, supra note 112, at 748 ("It has been an open secret for many years
that courts have been purporting to apply 'strict' liability doctrine to design and warnings
cases while in fact applying principles that look remarkably like negligence.").
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the position taken by the California Supreme Court in Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co." In Barker, the plaintiff alleged that he
was injured due to design defects in a high lift loader." The
court recognized the formulation of the correct test for design
defect cases was a "formidable task" and set about to determine
the answer in a manner consistent with the "fundamental policies
which underlie the entire strict product liability doctrine.'. 2 4 The
end result of this inquiry was a two pronged test to determine
design defects. The court stated:
[I]n design defect cases, a court may properly instruct a
jury that a product is defective in design if (1) the plaintiff
proves that the product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended
or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) the plaintiff
proves that the product's design proximately caused injury
and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant
factors, that on balance the benefits of the challenged de-
sign outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such de-
sign. 125
The court acknowledged that in some situations the consumer ex-
pectation test may be inadequate, primarily when the product is
patently dangerous.2 6 In these situations, the court rejected the
consumer expectation test, refusing to let the "low esteem in which
the public might hold a dangerous product to diminish the
m 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (holding that once a plaintiff demonstrates that a
product's design proximately caused his injury, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove
that when all relevant factors are considered, the benefits of the challenged design out-
weigh the risks of inherent danger). While by no means the law of the land, California
has always been a leader in the development and shaping of modem products liability
law. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1994) (Traynor,
J., concurring) (advocating strict liability for manufacturers who place products on the
market with the knowledge that those products will be used without inspection by the
consumer); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962) ("A
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market knowing it
is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
a human being.").
" See Barker, 573 P.2d at 443. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the loader was
defective because it had an unusually narrow base and was not equipped with "outrig-
gers," mechanical arms that would have stabilized the machine and prevented it from
tipping over. See id. at 447-48.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
See id. at 454.
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manufacturer's responsibility for injuries caused by that prod-
uct." 27 This interpretation of the risk-benefit test allows the
plaintiff to use it as a "sword" if the consumer expectation test is
insufficient to protect the consumer's interest in safety.
Most importantly, the court explicitly rejected the application of
negligence principles in this type of case." "[The trier of fact
must focus on the product, not on the manufacturer's conduct, and
the plaintiff need not prove that the manufacturer acted unreason-
ably or negligently in order to prevail in such an action. '
The Barker test is important because it attempts to preserve a
middle ground in the battle over the applicable standard in design
defect cases. It represents a real effort to remain true to the princi-
ples of strict liability while realizing some of the special concerns
that are raised in the area of design defects.
C. Which Test Should Be Applied in Air Bag Design Defect
Litigation?
The Reporters for the Restatement (Third) have claimed that
the consumer expectation test is accepted in only a minority of
courts, and should thus become less prominent in the new Restate-
ment."' However, there is certainly no consensus on the
issue.' 3' Due to the considerable disagreement, and the potentially
1. Id. at 447.
12 See id.
12. Id.
'- See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIITI Foreword (Proposed
Final Draft, 1997). The ALI proposes to alter the elements of proof involved in a claim
of design defect. "[A] claim of design defect must ... be established by a showing of
reasonable alternative design," not with the reasonable consumer expectations test. Id.; see
id. § 2; see also James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron Twerski, A Proposed Revision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv., 1512, 1532
n.25 (1992) (distinguishing the authorities that have adopted a "consumer expectation"
approach from those that have adopted a "risk-utility" based standard).
". See Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers to Jury
Trial in Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1043, 1047 (1994) (contending that some of the standards imposed in the Restatement
(Third) are not only unduly burdensome to plaintiffs, but also are not clearly supported
by precedent); John F. Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will the A.L.I. Erode Strict Liability in the
Restatement (Third) for Products Liability, 10 ToURo L. REv. 21, 23-24 (arguing that a
strict liability standard for defective design cases is preferable to the negligence standard
favored by the drafters); John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law
Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A
Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 502-03 (1996)
[hereinafter Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes] (criticizing the drafters of the Restatement
(Third) for misinterpreting precedent to create a consensus in what standard governs prod-
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devastating long range consequences to consumers of adoption of
the Restatement (Third), a few words on the American Law Insti-
tute ("ALI"), the co-reporters, and the proposed Restatement are
necessary.
The ALI, which is responsible for selecting the co-reporters, "is
a self perpetuating organization of lawyers, judges, and academics,"
whose "primary function is to promulgate restatements of law."'"
They are not directly responsible to the people as elected represen-
tatives and, as such, their legitimacy, if they are to have any, must
stem from an aura of impartiality. 3 ' The need for impartiality is
heightened by the fact that many of the ALI members involved in
the revision process are far from disinterested observers. Several
commentators have expressed the opinion that the committee revis-
ing the Restatement is generally biased and "anti-consumer.""13
There is ample evidence that the ALI and the co-reporters are
not as open minded and impartial as they should be on the subject
of design defects and strict liability.'35 For example, Professors
Henderson and Twerski referred to strict liability as the "unyielding
liability rule," which is both "inefficient and unfair."'36 This was
before they were appointed as co-reporters. 37 In the words of one
commentator, "[tihe authors of the Third Restatement apparently
see a need to protect manufacturers, and are doing their best to fill
that need."'38 The lack of impartiality, and the one-sided process
which has tilted the proposed Third Restatement to an anti-consum-
er doctrine, has undermined its legitimacy.'39 Courts looking to it
for guidance should be wary of accepting its interpretation of the
existing law as gospel.
ucts liability where none exists); Ellen Wertheimer, The Third Restatement of Torts: An
Unreasonably Dangerous Doctrine, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1235, 1254 (1994) (arguing
that there is no consistent law of products liability throughout the U.S.).
"' Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 596 (1995).
3. See id.
" See Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes, supra note 131, at 507-13; Wertheimer,
supra note 131, at 1245-46 (pointing out that the advisors to the Third Restatement are
heavily weighted in favor of the defense).
" See Wertheimer, supra note 131 (pointing out that the drafters of the Second Re-
statement obviously felt that strict liability is perfectly consistent with, and may even be
mandated by, principles of fairness).
' Henderson & Twerski, supra note 130, at 1517.
'. It seems that the ALI knew what it wanted the new Restatement to say.
Wertheimer, supra note 131, at 1255.
See id. at 1256.
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Some of the problems caused by the proposed Restatement's
rigid rules can be illustrated in the air bag design defect case. The
consumer expectation test is the proper test to apply in air bag
litigation."4 In order to explain why, it is helpful to bear in mind
some of the policy justifications that support the concept of strict
liability, for if the policies behind a rule still apply there is no
reason to deviate from it.' Generally speaking, strict liability is
believed to increase social utility by satisfying four main objec-
tives: encouraging (perhaps even forcing) investment in product
safety; discouraging the public from using hazardous products;
reducing transaction costs; and promoting loss spreading. 42 The
first and fourth objectives take on added importance in defective
air bag cases.
Strict liability promotes investment in product safety by impos-
ing liability rules that encourage manufacturers to find ways to
reduce or eliminate avoidable product risks. 3 Although in theory
this objective may also be accomplished through the use of a neg-
ligence standard, it is certain that manufacturers will escape some,
if not most, negligence-based liability.'" Therefore, negligence is
considerably less effective at achieving the goal of enhanced prod-
uct safety. Under strict liability, "[m]anufacturers will be less likely
to escape liability and will have a greater incentive to invest in
efforts to reduce product risks."'4 5 With respect to the promotion
of loss spreading, the auto makers are quite capable of spreading
the loss effectively through increased prices and through obtaining
liability insurance for the known dangers.'"
" This Note does not address the question of whether or not the consumer expecta-
tion test is the correct test in every type of design defect case. As this Note shall attempt
to illustrate, the air bag cases present compelling reasons for application of the consumer
expectation test. The potential ramifications of applying either test in every design defect
case is beyond the scope of this Note.
4. Perhaps this fundamental principle lies at the heart of the proposed Restatement.
Since the co-reporters apparently do not agree with the policies that support the imposi-
tion of strict liability, it is understandable that they have attempted to alter it so radically.
The proposed Restatement effectively eliminates strict liability for design defects. See
REsTATEMEr (MTuRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY Foreword (Proposed Final Draft,
1997).
"' See James A. Henderson Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liabili-
ty, 69 CAL L. REV. 919, 931-32 (1981).
", See id.
'" This result obviously stems from the higher burden of proof placed on the plaintiff
who brings a negligence, rather than strict liability, cause of action.
"e Henderson, supra note 142, at 933.
' This is not meant to suggest that the ability to pay will alone justify the imposi-
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When it comes to increasing product safety, it is painfully
obvious that the auto industry will not undertake the task unless,
(1) it is in their own best interests in the form of higher profits, or
(2) they are forced to do so by the government, the courts, or the
marketplace. One of the primary reasons for this is the cost of
increasing the safety of the cars. 47 One chilling and dramatic ex-
ample of this can be seen in the Ford Pinto case, Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co." In Grimshaw, "Ford knew from its own pre-
marketing testing that the Pinto gas tank was subject to two serious
problems upon rear impact."'49  Both problems involved a
frightening tendency for the tank to rupture, gasoline to spill, and a
fire to result. 5° In Grimshaw, the court found that although Ford
could have made the vehicle relatively safe for approximately $15
per car, it chose not to incur the extra cost.' In an internal
memorandum that was ruled inadmissible during the trial, Ford
made cost-benefit calculations concerning gas tank integrity:
152
Using the number of anticipated deaths and injuries that
would occur over the expected life of the model involved,
Ford calculated the total amount of liability it expected to
incur. Ford then compared that total with the net savings
that would be generated, at eleven dollars per car, by not
correcting the hazard. Its total savings would have been
almost ninety million dollars.'
tion of liability. As has been stated too many times to cite, manufacturers are not the
"insurers of their products." However, in the air bag situation, where one side has all of
the information and tells the other what it pleases, it can be said that it has assumed
some level of culpability by removing the ability to make an informed choice. The aver-
age consumer, until recently, had no knowledge of the danger. Furthermore, the average
consumer has no ability to bear the entire loss. It is particularly unfair to force consumers
to do so in this type of situation.
" See Gerald F. Tietz, Strict Product Liability, Design Defects and Corporate Deci-
sion-Making: Greater Deterrence through Stricter Process, 38 VILL. L. REv. 1361, 1393
(1993) (discussing the auto industry's use of cost-benefit analyses).
14. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct- App. 1981).
,. Tietz, supra note 147, at 1395; see Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (discussing
the design of the Pinto, and Ford's pre-marketing knowledge of the car's deficiencies).
'5' See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
'5'. See id. at 361. Some commentators have suggested that the dangerous condition
could have been remedied for as little as $5.08 per car. See FRANCIS T. CuLLEN ET AL.,
CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATACK 162 (1987).
52 See Tietz, supra note 147, at 1395. The memo was ruled inadmissible because it
directly concerned roll-over situations, not rear impact collisions. See id.
" Id. at 1395-96. In a very real sense, Ford was engaging in the type of balancing
that is required by the risk-benefit test. This callous calculation, that requires balancing
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In addition to the auto industry's reluctance to increase cost or
decrease the bottom line, there is considerable evidence that it ap-
pears to have a general aversion to new safety measures. "Corpo-
rations tend to view the notion of safety, separate from consider-
ations of specific safety costs, as incompatible with their quest for
profits."'' 4 For example, General Motors attempted to thwart or
delay the requirement of rear window stoplamps, even in the face
of NHTSA studies that showed they reduced rear end colli-
sions.'55 There is also ample support for this contention in the
tumultuous history of FMVSS 208, and the auto industry's fierce
resistance to its enactment at every opportunity.'56 It is clear that
the policies that support strict liability in the abstract are quite
relevant and justify its application in the air bag design cases.
Since there are strong policy justifications for applying strict
liability to the automobile manufacturers for defectively designed
air bags, what are the purported reasons to justify a departure from
the consumer expectation test in the area of design defects? The
most prominent justification is that "consumers in many design
situations lack any real or informed expectation."'57 While this
may be true in certain situations, it is clearly erroneous in the
context of air bags.'
The correct standard and test to apply in design defect cases
was discussed in detail by the California Supreme Court in Soule
v. General Motors Corp.'59 In Soule, the plaintiff suffered serious
injuries to her ankles when she was involved in an automobile
accident."6 The plaintiff sued General Motors, asserting that her
the value of human life against corporate profits, illustrates a serious problem with the
risk-benefit test.
Assume that air bags installed in production vehicles today cost, on average, $250
per unit. What if a new, safer design could be produced for $300? $500? Does the extra
cost outweigh the risk of death or serious injury posed by the cheaper air bag? These are
not simple questions with simple answers. Also, does it make sense to allow the auto
manufacturer to maximize profits by selecting the cheaper air bag design and then escape
liability because the better air bag's cost was too high? This seems to be an inequitable
result.
' Id. at 1400-01.
'" See id. at 1401.
' See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
'n Green, supra note 107, at 612.
' Through aggressive advertising, consumers established real opinions and expecta-
tions about air bags and their safety. See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
" 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).
See id. at 301.
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injuries were the result of a defect in both the manufacture6 and
design of the vehicle. General Motors contended that the con-
sumer expectation test is improper "whenever 'crashworthiness,' a
complex product, or technical questions of causation are at is-
sue." 63 General Motors argued that:
[The] test is deficient and unfair in several respects: First,
it defies definition."6 Second, it focuses not on the objec-
tive condition of products, but on the subjective, unstable,
and often unreasonable opinions of consumers. 65 Third, it
ignores the reality that ordinary consumers know little
about how safe complex products they use can or should
be made. Fourth, it invites the jury to isolate the particular
consumer, component, accident, and injury .... Fifth, it
eliminates the careful balancing of risks and benefits which
is essential to any design issue.'66
The court acknowledged the dangers of improper use of the
consumer expectation test, but explicitly rejected General Motors'
suggestion to abolish it." "[W]e cannot accept GM's insinuation
that ordinary consumers lack any legitimate expectations about the
minimum safety of the products they use. In particular circumstanc-
es, a product's design may perform so unsafely that the defect is
apparent to the common reason, experience, and understanding of
its ordinary consumers."' 1s The court did rule, however, that in
this particular case the consumer expectation test was inappropri-
ate."6 The court stated:
16. See id. at 302. She asserted that as a result of substandard welding, the left front
wheel collapsed rearward and inward, causing her injuries. See id.
"i- See id. The design of the bracket and configuration of the frame were allegedly
defective because they did not limit the wheel's rearward travel. See id. As a result, the
"toe pan" crumpled into the passenger compartment, thus injuring her ankles. See id.
I Id. at 309.
' Perhaps General Motors just does not like the result that would flow from the
application of standard English definitions to these words.
" This argument is particularly specious in the context of air bags, because the auto
makers, through extensive advertising, created whatever opinions and expectations consum-
ers have of this device. See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
1 Soule, 882 P.2d at 309-10.
367. See id. at 310.
I d. An example of this might be when a highly touted safety device, such as an
air bag, seriously injures or kills the user.
'" See id.
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An ordinary consumer of automobiles cannot reasonably
expect that a car's frame, suspension, or interior will be
designed to remain intact in any and all accidents. Nor
would ordinary experience and understanding inform such a
consumer how safely an automobile's design should per-
form under the esoteric circumstances of the collision at
issue here. 7
This decision was based on the specific facts of the case. Air
bags, on the other hand, present a much different factual situation.
Consumers can reasonably expect that air bags will not kill them if
they are in a minor accident. Furthermore, performance during a
collision is the only expectation that consumers will have with
respect to air bags; it is the only time they are supposed to per-
form. It would be unfortunate for any court to preclude the use of
the consumer expectation test in an air bag case. It is patently
absurd to suggest that the ordinary consumer lacks any legitimate
expectations about the minimum safety of an air bag. They have
been heavily marketed as a safety device. Consumers have paid
extra for the privilege of having them in their cars. It taxes credu-
lity to suggest that the American public is so stupid that it is will-
ing to pay more for an item in which it has no legitimate expecta-
tion of performance. Furthermore, the automotive industry should
not be heard to complain that this expectation is false or unreason-
able in light of the fact that it is the one responsible for the expec-
tation in the first place.'
In a more recent case, the California Court of Appeals, follow-
ing the reasoning of both the Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,"
and Soule v. General Motors Corp." decisions, held that the
consumer expectation test was applicable in an air bag design de-
fect case. In Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp.,74 the plaintiff, Mary
Bresnahan, alleged personal injuries as a result of a driver-side air
17 id.
-. See Fred Mannering & Clifford Winston, Automobile Air Bags in the 1990's: Mar-
ket Failure or Market Efficiency?, 38 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267 (1995) (observing that a
good deal of consumers' information about air bags came from the automakers them-
selves); see also infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
17. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1918); see supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the opinion).
" 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994); see supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text
(discussing the opinion).
"' 32 Cal. App. 4th 1559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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bag deployment in a relatively low-speed collision.75 At trial, the
court granted the defendants' motion for nonsuit following the
plaintiff's opening statement." The court did so after ruling that
the consumer expectation test was inappropriate in the case.V
The appellate court reversed the nonsuit and directed that the plain-
tiff be allowed to proceed using the consumer expectation test. 78
In attempting to prevent the application of the consumer expec-
tation test, Chrysler presented the appellate court with a number of
arguments. First, Chrysler claimed that since relatively few consum-
ers have experienced the deployment of an air bag, the consumer
expectation test was inappropriate. 79 The court noted that this
would be the case every time safety equipment was initially trig-
gered, and dismissed the contention as irrelevant. 8 ° The important
consideration for the court was "whether the everyday experience
of the consumer permits him or her to entertain minimum safety
expectations of the product's performance under foreseeable cir-
cumstances.'... The court felt that "an ordinary consumer would
be capable of forming an expectation, one way or the other about
whether the design of the highly publicized, and by now common-
place product of an air-bag-equipped automobile satisfied minimal
safety expectations."''
The court also rejected Chrysler's second argument, that the
technical novelty of the air bag would preclude the consumer ex-
pectation test. 83 Application of the test is not "foreclosed simply
because expert testimony may be necessary to explain the nature of
the alleged defect or the mechanism of the product's failure."'
84
Third, Chrysler argued that asserted governmental conclusions
about the benefits of air bags established that their use outweighs
and justifies the risk of injuries." 5 The court rejected this as well,
stating that "[r]isk benefit weighing is not a formal part of, nor
7. See id. at 1562. The air bag allegedly forced her arm into contact with her car's
overarching windshield, causing extensive damage to her elbow. See id. at 1562.
1 See id.
'. See id. The court granted the nonsuit to allow for appellate review of its in limine
ruling that confined the plaintiff to a risk-benefit test. See id.
'7 See id.
'7' See id. at 1568.
IS'. See id.
"* Id.
52. Id.
183. See id.
", Id.
". See id. at 1569.
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may it serve as a 'defense' to the consumer expectation test. ' ' 86
The court went further, ruling that "Chrysler may not adduce risk-
benefit analysis as a counterweight or 'defense' to proof under the
consumer expectation test.' '817 This last ruling is significant be-
cause it recognizes that the consumer expectation test is separate
and distinct from the risk-benefit test. The consumer expectation
test is not to be used merely as one element of the risk-benefit
test, as the latest version of the proposed Restatement suggests. 88
D. Why It Matters Which Test Is Used
Aside from the fact that the risk-benefit test is utilized as a
negligence standard in disguise, there are at least two major rea-
sons that the consumer expectation test is preferable to plaintiffs:
(1) the alleged social utility of air bags as a safety device is mis-
leading, and (2) it is difficult to prove a reasonable alternate design
under the risk-benefit test. 89
Under the risk-benefit test, auto manufacturers will attempt to
establish the social utility of the air bag through the introduction of
evidence of the life-saving qualities of air bags in general. Air bag
proponents claim that to date air bags have saved over 1100 lives
and reduced traffic fatalities by 11%."9 While these statistics are
eye-catching, they are extremely misleading and irrelevant to the
proper disposition of a products liability lawsuit alleging a defec-
tively designed air bag. First, these studies were conducted by the
same people who mandated air bags, arguably calling the validity
of the studies into question.'9 ' Even NHTSA officials concede
that their air bag "save" figures are far from precise, and would
probably not withstand statistical scrutiny."9 Second, the purport-
ed 11% reduction in fatalities does not address the fact that air
bags may actually increase fatalities for persons who are under the
16 Id.
,,* Id. at 1570.
"'* See RESrATEMENT (T-mD) OF TORTS: PRoDucrs LIABIuTY § 2 (Proposed Final
Draft, 1997); see also supra note 130.
1,9. See Leebron, supra note 102, at 404-05 (comparing the standards which plaintiffs
must meet under each test).
'" See NHTSA, EFFECIVENESS, supra note 74, at 2-3; NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN., FATALITY REDUCTION BY AIR BAGS: ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT DATA
THROUGH EARLY 1996, at 19 (1996) (indicating safety statistics for air bags).
". See Asra Q. Nomani & Jeffrey Taylor, Shaky U.S. Data Drive Air-Bag Debate:
Statistics Don't Show If Seat Belts Were Used, WALL ST. J. (Europe), Jan. 23, 1997, at 8
(noting that the data assessing air bags' effectiveness comes from NHTSA itself).
- See id.
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age of thirteen, over the age of seventy, or small in stature.93
These problems become merely peripheral, however, when the
issue is stated correctly. These statistics are only relevant when
comparing the overall benefits of the current air bag versus no air
bag at all. This is not the ultimate comparison that must be made.
The correct consideration will involve comparing the benefits of
the air bag that caused the injury, versus some other "safer" air
bag. Put simply, the issue is not whether any air bag is defective,
but whether this particular air bag is defective. 94 When viewed
in this light, these statistics are highly prejudicial and their only
purpose is to mislead the jury into deciding the case on improper
grounds. 95
The second major disadvantage facing plaintiffs under the risk-
benefit test is the difficulty in proving a reasonable alternate de-
sign. As a practical matter this would quite likely be required in
order to recover under either theory in an air bag case."9 The
auto manufacturers contend that in order to meet FMVSS 208, the
air bags must be designed as they are."9 While that issue is
193 See NHTSA, EFFEcTIVENESS, supra note 74, at 3, 18, 27.
l"t The existing statistics are flawed because they come from a study of all air bags
and do not account for variations in each type of air bag. However, all air bags are not
the same: each case of injury, in fact, will involve only one air bag design. In addition,
it is possible that an alternate air bag design could be developed which would retain the
life-saving potential of current air bags while eliminating some, if not all, of their dan-
gers. See infra notes 198-214 and accompanying text Yet, even if so, it would be diffi-
cult to prove at present that such a design would save as many (or more) lives than the
current designs. Thus, because of the high degree of speculation involved in evaluating
the statistics currently available, extreme caution should be used before suggesting that a
jury use them as a basis for a decision.
" For example, the jury may be confused into thinking that it is deciding the relative
merits of air bags in general. If it subsequently bases its decision on a belief that air
bags are good devices, or that the manufacturer was merely trying to provide a safety
feature, it would be in error. As mentioned earlier, the manufacturer's conduct is not the
issue in strict liability; the only issue is the condition of the product. See Wilton &
Campbell, supra note 104, at 555 (comparing the negligence approach, which focuses on
the prudence of the manufacturer, with strict liability, in which the vehicle's state is the
focus).
" While this could present a difficult burden for plaintiffs to meet, it would probably
still be required because of FMVSS 208. If there were no altemative design, the manufac-
turer might successfully argue that the claim is preempted. This would be the reverse of
the failure to install type case. In effect, it would be a "failure because you installed"
claim, which arguably impliedly conflicts with the "choice" given by the standard. The
probable fate of these claims may be assessed by looking at the "failure to install" cases.
See supra Part II.B.
1" It is extremely important to remember that FMVSS 208 does not require any par-
ticular design. Design specifications were, in fact, removed in an effort to give the
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clearly not resolved and will eventually be decided by the trier of
fact, there is considerable evidence that the auto manufacturers are
not being entirely forthcoming about potential, alternate air bag
technology.
One suggested alternate design is the "dual speed air bag." '
Joan Claybrook, former Administrator of NHTSA under President
Carter, believes that this might be the answer. According to Ms.
Claybrook, dual speed air bags, which inflate slowly in low speed
crashes and faster in high speed accidents, would maintain protec-
tion for adults in high speed crashes without sacrificing safety for
children in low speed collisions."9 This technology was available
as far back as the mid-1970's, when General Motors installed dual-
stage inflation air bags in over 10,000 cars sold to the public.ro
Furthermore, according to Ms. Claybrook, the auto makers already
have the knowledge and capability to implement this technology in
mass-production vehicles. In fact, luxury car makers such as
Mercedes and BMW already offer designs that distinguish the force
of the crash and whether or not the occupants are wearing seat
belts.2 1
A 1981 study performed for NHTSA by Minicars, Inc. also
reported highly favorable results for dual-inflation systems."r2 The
report stated that although single-level inflation can satisfy the
safety standards' protection requirements, "analysis and develop-
ment have found a multi-level system to be better."' 3 The "stud-
ies showed that the use of a dual level system logic similar to that
used in the GM production air bags of the mid-1970's could sig-
nificantly reduce injuries to forward positioned children, yet still
automakers some flexibility. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash
Protection, 58 Fed. Reg. 46,551, 46,552 (1993) (stating generally that vehicles must have
"automatic crash protection"); id. at 46,562 (observing that NHTSA "does not wish to
unnecessarily restrict future air bag designs"). FMVSS 208 is merely a performance stan-
dard, under which each vehicle must meet minimum injury requirements as measured on a
test dummy in a 30 MPH crash barrier test. See id. at 46,553.
" See Joan Claybrook, Statement on FMVSS 208 and Air Bags Transportation
Subcommittee on Appropriations House of Representatives (visited Mar. 6, 1998)
<http://www.citizen.orgtclaytesLhtml>; Marcia Stepanek, Safety Officials To Modify Rules
Governing Air Bags, THE TIMES UNION (Albany), Nov. 22, 1996, at Al.
'" See Claybrook, supra note 198.
See id.
" See id. One might logically infer from these facts that the technology is available
for those willing or able to pay the added price.
See 2 D. T'1HEODORE ZINKE, SMALL CAR FRONT SEAT PASSENGER INFLATABLE
RESTRANT SYSTEM, CITATION AIR BAG SYSTEMS 1 (1981).
Id. at 3.
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maintain high performance levels for adults in severe crashes."' °
Perhaps most importantly, the study concluded that the low-level
deployment met the FMVSS 208 injury criteria." It is disturbing
that this report has been ignored by the American automotive in-
dustry in the sixteen years that have passed since its completion.
Another potential alternative design, the tethered air bag, may
not completely eliminate the problem, but is likely to help in some
situations. The theory behind tethering is that by altering the dis-
tance the inflated bag travels towards the passenger before impact,
the force of the impact is altered.2" A study performed for
NHTSA in 1992 analyzed the deployment characteristics of differ-
ent air bag designs, and compared tethered and untethered air
bags.2° The untethered air bags, on average, extended five inches
further than the tethered bags."a As a result, the distance between
the vehicle occupant and the deploying air bag is increased.2"
Common sense indicates that this is a good thing.
The study also measured the peak air bag velocities of nine
different air bag designs, all of which met FMVSS 208 injury
criteria.10 The velocities of the deployed air bags ranged from 98
MPH to 211 MPH.21' Thus, the force at which some air bags im-
pact the occupant is significantly less than the force at which other
air bags do. This might explain why certain vehicles, made by
certain manufacturers, appear to account for an inordinately high
percentage of the most serious injuries. In November 1996, the
Center For Auto Safety petitioned NHTSA to begin defect investi-
gations into the air bags installed in Chrysler 1994-1996 minivans,
Ford 1990-1992 Taurus', and General Motors 1991-1992 Chevrolet
Berettas and Corsicas.22 The Center claims that these models ac-
count for one-third of all air bag injuries and deaths, even though
they account for less than 10% of all air bags on the road.13
W Id.
: See id. at 17.
See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFEFY COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra
note 4, at 30-31.
21 See id.
m See id. at 31.
29. See id.
210. See id. at 30.
211. See id. at 31.
212 See Motor Vehicles: NHTSA Requests Data From Big Three in Response to Air
Bag Defects Petition, 25 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 133 (Feb. 7, 1997).
213. See id.
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Honda, on the other hand, uses a less aggressive air bag than other
manufacturers and has not had any reported fatalities.2P4
Whether an alternate design is reasonable in a certain set of
circumstances is an issue that will have to be addressed on a case-
by-case basis. However, these studies demonstrate that not all air
bags are the same, and some are obviously not as safe as others.
E. Failure to Warn
If plaintiffs are unable to carry the burden of proving that the
air bag was defective in its design, they may still be able to recov-
er on the theory of failure-to-warn. Generally speaking, there are
two different types of failure to warn claims.
The first type of claim is based on the premise that the con-
sumer had the right to be apprised of the risk in order to make an
informed choice about whether or not to use the product.215 This
claim requires the plaintiff to show that he would not have used
the product had the risk been known.216 Because the air bag is
but one component in a much larger product-people buy cars, not
air bags--this type of claim is of somewhat limited relevance to
air bag litigation. Furthermore, with the high percentage of new
vehicles that contain air bags, the consumer is not faced with a
legitimate choice regarding air bag use.211
In the second type of claim, the plaintiff asserts that the prod-
uct could have been made safe, or at least safer, if adequate warn-
ings or instructions had been provided.1 ' In the context of air
bags, the plaintiff would claim, for example, that the automaker did
not warn him that air bags could kill children. Unaware of the
serious danger, he continued to place his child in the front seat. As
a result, his child was seriously injured or killed by the air bag.
This type of claim is extremely relevant to the air bag situation
and, in light of the difficulty and prohibitive cost of proving defec-
tive design, should be included in any claim against the
automakers.
The first thing that must be done when considering a potential
2I, See Claybrook, supra note 198.
215 See Leebron, supra note 102, at 415.
2 1 See id.
217. It should be noted that NHTSA recently authorized the use of on-off switches for
certain specified categories of car owners. Under the new rule, car owners must apply to
NHTSA to de-activate the airbag, and NHTSA ultimately decides whether the owner may
de-activate or not. See Air Bag On-Off Switches, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406, 62,441-42 (1997).
2' See Leebron, supra note 102, at 415.
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failure to warn claim is to determine when the vehicle was pro-
duced. This will place the vehicle into one of three categories: (1)
vehicles produced before September 1, 1994, (2) vehicles produced
after September 1, 1994, and (3) vehicles produced after February
25, 1997. The different warning labels required by NHTSA as of
these dates will present each category with different warning lan-
guage and different preemption concerns.
Prior to September 1, 1994, FMVSS 208 had no explicit provi-
sions concerning air bag safety warning labels.219 Claims involv-
ing vehicles produced before this date will not be subject to a
claim of preemption. In November 1996, NHTSA issued a final
rule amending the existing requirements for air bag warning labels
in all air bag equipped vehicles manufactured on or after February
25, 1997.'o These new, improved warning labels are very de-
tailed and attention grabbing. They explicitly warn of death and the
serious dangers to small children." The adequacy of these new
warnings is beyond the scope of this Note, although they are clear-
ly an improvement over previous labelling.
This Note will focus on the second category of vehicles: those
produced after September 1, 1994, but before February 25, 1997.
In 1993, NHTSA mandated that the following sun-visor label be
included in all air bag equipped vehicles manufactured after Sep-
tember 1, 1994:
CAUTION
TO AVOID SERIOUS INJURY:
For maximum safety protection in all types of crashes, you
must always wear your safety belt.
Do not install rearward-facing child seats in any front pas-
senger seat position.
Do not sit or lean unnecessarily close to the air bag.
Do not place any objects over the air bag or between the
air bag and yourself.
See the owner's manual for further information and expla-
nations."'
219. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 61 Fed.
Reg. 60,206, 60,215 (1996).
See id. at 60,215-16.
See id. at 60,217-21.
m. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 58 Fed.
Reg. 46,551, 46,564 (1993).
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The coloring of this lettering was supposed to contrast with the
background of the label.' When the sun-visor is in the stowed
position, an air bag alert label which reads "Air bag. See Other
Side" is required." 4 The rule also states that "[n]o other informa-
tion shall appear on the same side of the sun-visor to which the
label is affixed."
At first glance, this rule appears to deliver a crushing blow to
a cause of action for failure to warn; NHTSA was clear in its
desire for uniform sun-visor labels. It is important to remem-
ber, however, that these rules merely apply to sun-visor labels.
NHTSA expressly provided that the "[mianufacturers are free, of
course, to provide additional information in other places."'
NHTSA also did not mandate any particular language that must be
included in the owner's manual. "
In order to accurately assess the adequacy of a warning, one
must judge it in its entirety. The total warning consists of the sum
of its parts, hot each portion individually. The entire "warning
package" must be adequate or else the warning will not effectively
serve any purpose. It would be inequitable to preempt a failure to
warn claim because the manufacturer complied with mandatory
warning language for one location on the product. The manufactur-
ers were free to provide additional information to the consumer
and some did. The adequacy of the entire "'waring package" can
be fairly assessed by the jury, and it would be unfair to prevent
the jury from doing so.
There are three primary questions that will shape the analysis
in this area: (1) Was the automotive industry aware of the risks
and dangers posed by air bags?; (2) Were the warning labels suffi-
cient to alert the user of the nature and degree of the danger, as
well as how that danger can be avoided?; (3) Did the automotive
industry undercut or diminish the warnings through promotion of
See id. No specific colors were mandated. Many manufacturers chose to use light
gray lettering on a white background. Some might argue that these are not contrasting
colors. In the new warnings, bright yellow and black lettering is mandatory to avoid this
type of minimizing. See id. at 46,564.
" See id.
2.Id.
2" See UL ("NHTSA has . . . concluded that the sun visor label should be uniform
for all vehicles").
2'* Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 46,557, 46,564.
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the air bag as a safety device? Each of these inquiries can be taken
separately.
1. Did the Automakers Know?
In a 1969 research paper written by General Motors, the
automaker concluded that "a small child close to an instrument
panel from which an air cushion is deployed may, in our present
estimation, be severely injured or even killed." 9 In the years that
followed, the automotive industry conducted numerous tests on air
bags, particularly their known effects on children and out-of-posi-
tion smaller adults, all of which showed ample evidence of the
dangers posed by air bags.' In his 1984 autobiography, Lee
Iacocca expressed concern that air bags could kill vehicle passen-
gers,"t adding that "air bags are one of those areas where the
solution may be worse than the problem. ' While most experts
would dispute Iacocca's 1984 contention, it is doubtful that anyone,
especially the automotive industry, could deny the simple fact that
the automotive industry was painfully aware of the serious, life-
threatening, and potentially fatal dangers that air bags posed. This
knowledge left the auto industry with two options. They could
either design an air bag that was safe and effective for all size
' Warren Brown & Cindy Skrzycki, U.S. Doubts on Air Bags Date to '69; No
Warnings Issued On Suspected Danger to Small Passengers, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1996,
at Al; see also Air Bag Safety: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transp., 105th Cong. 136 (1997) (statement of Robert Sanders, Parents' Coalition for
Air Bag Warnings); Joan Claybrook, Editorial, GM Knew About Air Bag Problems,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 9, 1996, at 9B.
" See, e.g., HJ. MERTZ ST AL., RESPONSES OF ANIMALS EXPOSED TO DEPLOYMENT
OF VARIOUS PASSENGER INFLATABLE RESTRAINT SYSTEM CONCEPTS FOR A VARIETY OF
COLLISION SEVERITIES AND ANIMAL POSITIONS (1982); F. MONTALVO Er AL., GENERAL
MOTORS CORP., POSSIBLE POSITIONS AND POSTURES OF UNRESTRAINED FRONT-SEAT CHIL-
DREN AT INSTANT OF COLLISION (1982); ULRICH W. SEIFFERT & GUNNAR H. BORENIUS,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER, VOLKSWAGENWERK AG, GERMANY, DEVELOPMENT
PROBLEMS WITH INFLATABLE RESTRAINTS IN SMALL PASSENGER VEHICLES (1972).
2'" See LEE IACOCCA, IACOCCA: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 300-01 (1984).
"' Id. Iacocca went on to say: "I'm not sure I'd want one of those gizmos in my
car." Id. at 301. In an interesting change of heart, Iacocca himself became Chrysler's air
bag pitchman when Chrysler began to install them as standard equipment. See Chrysler
Ad Campaign Touts Safety of Air. Bags, Highway & Vehicle Safety Rep. (Stamler Publ'g
Co., Branford, CL), Apr. 23, 1990, at 5 [hereinafter Chrysler Ad Campaign]. According to
lacocca, air bags are "the greatest innovation since four-wheel brakes." Don Sherman, It's
in the Bag, POPULAR SC., OcL 1992, at 58. Iacocca explained that while he had previ-
ously doubted air bags, new technology had made him a believer. See JOHN D. GRAHAM,
AUTO SAFETY: ASSESSING AMERICA'S PERFORMANCE 212 (1989) (describing Chrysler's ads
in the New York Times and other newspapers in which this statement is attributed to
Iacocca).
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occupants or, failing that, provide adequate warnings of the dangers
involved. They chose not to modify the design of their air bags.
2. Were the Warnings Adequate?
Determining the adequacy of a warning is not an easy task. As
previously stated, this determination will ultimately be a jury ques-
tion. But generally speaking, juries will be guided by the principle
that "adequate means that the reasonable user is likely to read it
and that it sufficiently alerts the user to the nature and degree of
the danger, as well as how that danger can best be avoided." 3 A
plaintiff will thus need to assert that the total "warning package"
provided to him concerning air bags was inadequate, because it
failed to sufficiently alert him of the nature and degree of danger,
and how to avoid it.
Since the language provided by individual manufacturers in
advertising as well as in the owner's manual will vary, each case
will depend upon different facts. The Owner's Manual for a 1994
Dodge Intrepid shows a representative example of the additional
warnings that the manufacturers chose to provide. The Manual
states, "[rlelying on air bags alone could lead to more severe inju-
ries in a collision. The air bags work with your seat belt to restrain
you properly." ' Another warning states, "[b]eing too close to the
steering wheel or instrument panel during airbag deployment could
cause serious injury. Airbags need room to inflate." 5 At no
point is the possibility of death mentioned. Neither are the dangers
to small children. In fact, consumers were warned explicitly that air
bags can "harm your pet," but were told nothing about the risks to
their children.
The inadequacy of the warnings can be further established with
evidence that the "warning packages" provided by the auto manu-
facturers have clearly failed to work. The warnings did nothing to
increase the public awareness of air bag dangers. Only the increas-
ing death toll and the concerned pleas of grieving parents have
been able to do this. In fact, a recent survey performed by the
Center for Risk Analysis at the Harvard School of Public Health
shows that many consumers are still unaware of the serious dan-
gers created by air bags. 7 "Nearly sixty percent of adults
Leebron, supra note 102, at 416.
CHRYSLER CoRP., OwNER's MANUAL 1994 DODGE INTREPID'24 (1994).
2. Id.
' See id. at 28.
" See Most Unaware Passenger-Side Air Bags Are Danger to Kids, CLEVELAND
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polle.. mistakenly believe that air bags are helping more chil-
dren than they are hurting.""8
3. Did the Automakers Undercut or Diminish the Warnings?
The air bag has been heavily marketed to the American auto-
mobile consumer as a safety device. In 1990, Chrysler launched a
major advertising campaign focused on the safety of the air
bag. 9 The ads featured professional drivers in actual crash tests
as well as testimonials from crash survivors.2" Chrysler chairman
Lee Iacocca was featured in many of the ads, which all concluded
with the campaign theme: "Advantage: Chrysler."' The ads did
not mention any of the risks known to be associated with air bags.
They were part of a well-planned strategy to promote the air bag
as a safety device that every car owner should have.24
What precisely caused the automotive industry to install air
bags as standard equipment in their vehicles before the mandatory
compliance date is debatable. Some might argue that it was out of
an altruistic desire to produce the safest vehicle for the public.
Others might argue that it was because of a desire to comply with
the federal regulations ahead of schedule.243 It is far more likely
that the true motivation was a basic desire to increase profits.2"
PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 17, 1997, at 9A (discussing the results of the Harvard study).
2" Id. According to John Graham, the Director of the Center for Risk Analysis and
the study's lead author, he has not "found any documented cases of children's lives being
saved" by an air bag. Id.
" See Chrysler Ad Campaign, supra note 232, at 5. This Note does not wish to
intimate that Chrysler was the only manufacturer to advertise in this manner. However,
Chrysler does provide an excellent illustration of how the air bag was marketed to the
American public. In particular, Chrysler used airbags to stress that their vehicles were
safer than Japanese cars. See id.
242 See id.
24. See id.
242 The overall merit of having air bags installed in vehicles is not the issue here.
Rather, it is the effect that advertising had on public perception of air bags in general,
and their willingness to pay extra for them in particular. Obviously, Chrysler and the
other car makers would have been foolish to advertise the air bag as a dangerous device.
This does not mean, however, that they were free to mislead the public by omitting vital
information.
24. This is somewhat unlikely considering the way in which the compliance dates for
this standard had been regularly delayed by the automotive industry, but nothing is impos-
sible. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text (documenting the alterations in com-
pliance dates).
24' See Mannering & Winston, supra note 171, at 278 (discussing the role of consum-
er demand in the air bag debate and stating that "the recent widespread adoption of air
bags has not revived the decades-old debate over the justification for and effects of auto-
mobile safety regulations. As we see it, the adoption of air bags was a rational market
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A study published in the Journal of Law & Economics raised
some interesting points on this issue.245 The study set out to de-
termine why the number of air bag equipped vehicles had in-
creased so dramatically since 1988, and concluded that the ultimate
reason was the equally dramatic increase in the "consumer willing-
ness to pay."2 Interestingly, the two factors that had the greatest
influence on the willingness to pay were the number of friends
owning cars with air bags and the hours of daily television view-
ing.247 The average willingness to pay rose from $331 in 1990, to
over $500 in 1993."t Estimating the cost of the air bag between
$250 and $300,249 it was easy to see why they became standard
equipment in many vehicles. Air bags simply provided an opportu-
nity to increase profits by several hundred dollars per vehicle.aso
None of this makes the automotive industry guilty of anything,
but it does suggest that it had a very real interest in promoting the
air bag as a safety device. This interest was effectively carried out
through aggressive advertising, advertising that ran directly contrary
to the feeble warnings that were given. This also shows rather con-
vincingly that the automotive industry itself is directly responsible
for the public's perception of air bags. If public perception of air
bag safety had the effect of diminishing, or even negating the
minimal warnings that consumers were given, the car makers
should not be able to successfully hide behind those warnings to
outcome"). This does not suggest that there is anything wrong with such a desire; that is
why corporations are in business. However, the industry's motivation is relevant to under-
standing the entire air bag controversy and keeping it in perspective. For example, a great
deal of criticism has been focused on NHTSA by the automotive industry in an effort to
deflect responsibility for air bag injuries. While NHTSA and FMVSS 208 are clearly
involved in many past and future issues concerning air bags, it should be remembered
that NHTSA left air bag design specifications up to the car makers. NHTSA has also
shown a willingness to delay the compliance date if the air bags were not ready. See
supra Part II. Furthermore, NHTSA has no financial stake in air bags.
' See Mannering & Winston, supra note 171.
2 Id. at 275. "[W]illingess to pay for an air bag on a particular vehicle model has a
positive statistically significant effect on the probability that an air bag will be offered as
standard equipment." See id.
2". See id. at 270-71. According to the study, "television viewing provides opportuni-
ties to obtain hard evidence of air bag effectiveness through automakers' advertisements."
Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
24. See id. at 272.
2-9. See id. at 275.
- See id. The study also concluded that if every manufacturer discontinued air bags
they would each lose millions of dollars per year. See id. at 277. Even more interestingly,
the study concluded that if one individual manufacturer decided to discontinue them, that
manufacturer would lose hundreds of millions of dollars as a result. See id.
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avoid liability. In addition to the sun-visor warning label and the
information provided in the owner's manual, the complete "warning
package" should thus include statements made by the automotive
industry concerning air bags.
Although every plaintiff will have to establish these facts in
some manner, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that: (1) the
automotive industry was well aware of the serious dangers related
to air bags, (2) the "warning package" given prior to the most
recent changes in 1997 was inadequate, and (3) the warnings, inad-
equate to begin with, were made even less effective and perhaps
completely negated by the automotive industry through their ag-
gressive marketing of air bags as a necessary safety device. There
is a clear duty to warn of a known danger. The automotive indus-
try has breached this duty with respect to air bags. They should be
liable for that breach.
V. CONCLUSION
Products liability law is an extremely important area of Ameri-
can jurisprudence. It is the primary means through which the con-
sumer may seek redress for injuries suffered as a result of a defect
in a purchased product. Since the adoption of the Restatement of
Torts (Second) in 1965, strict liability under section 402A has been
the law of the land. It represents a belief that fault is not the issue
when an innocent consumer has been injured by a product he has
purchased. This Note argues that this belief was not faulty then, is
not faulty now, and should not be abandoned in the future.
Over the past several years numerous individuals, including
children, have been killed or seriously injured by the awesome
force of deploying air bags. This is a serious problem which re-
quires serious action. The prevention of future accidents is not
enough, though. Fixing the problem now may prevent future trage-
dies, but it will not eliminate the pain of those whose lives have
already been taken or destroyed in air bag related accidents. These
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individuals and their families deserve answers to their questions.
They deserve compensation for their losses: losses that could have
been prevented.
PATRICK J. NORTON
t I would like to thank my father for inspiring me, my mother for supporting me,
and Audra, just for being who she is.
6991998]

